6. Foreseeable risk factors可預(yù)期的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素;

　　Users of financial information and market participants need information on reasonably foreseeable material risks that may include: risks that are specific to the industry or the geographical areas in which the company operates; dependence on commodities; financial market risks including interest rate or currency risk; risk related to derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions; and risks related to environmental liabilities.

　　The Principles do not envision the disclosure of information in greater detail than is necessary to fully inform investors of the material and foreseeable risks of the enterprise. Disclosure of risk is most effective when it is tailored to the particular industry in question. Disclosure about the system for monitoring and managing risk is increasingly regarded as good practice.

　　財(cái)務(wù)信息的使用者和市場(chǎng)參與者需要合理預(yù)期重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的信息，包括：行業(yè)及地域的特定風(fēng)險(xiǎn);對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)產(chǎn)品的依賴性的風(fēng)險(xiǎn);金融市場(chǎng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，包括利率和匯率;與衍生產(chǎn)品和表外交易有關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn);對(duì)環(huán)境責(zé)任的相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

　　本準(zhǔn)則并不認(rèn)為企業(yè)需要披露過多的信息，只要可以使投資者充分了解企業(yè)的重大的可預(yù)見風(fēng)險(xiǎn)即可。符合行業(yè)特殊性的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)披露是最有效的。對(duì)監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的披露越來越被重視。

　　7. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders關(guān)于員工和其他利益相關(guān)者的問題。

　　Companies are encouraged, and in some countries even obliged, to provide information on key issues relevant to employees and other stakeholders that may materially affect the performance of the company. Disclosure may include management/employee relations, and relations with other stakeholders such as creditors, suppliers, and local communities.

　　Some countries require extensive disclosure of information on human resources. Human resource policies, such as programmes for human resource development and training, retention rates of employees and employee share ownership plans, can communicate important information on the competitive strengths of companies to market participants.

　　公司被鼓勵(lì)、甚至在一些國(guó)家被規(guī)定為有義務(wù)，提供那些可能對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)有重大影響的、與員工和其他利益相關(guān)者有關(guān)的重大事件的信息。披露的信息應(yīng)包括經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層和員工的關(guān)系，與其他利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)系，如貸款人、供貨商和當(dāng)?shù)仄渌鐣?huì)團(tuán)體。

　　一些國(guó)家要求廣泛披露公司人力資源管理的信息。人力資源管理政策，如人力資源發(fā)展和培訓(xùn)的計(jì)劃、員工輪換的速度、以及員工持股計(jì)劃等等，這些可以傳遞公司與其市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者之間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力強(qiáng)弱的相關(guān)信息。

　　8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented.

　　Companies should report their corporate governance practices, and in a number of countries such disclosure is now mandated as part of the regular reporting. In several countries, companies must implement corporate governance principles set, or endorsed, by the listing authority with mandatory reporting on a comply or explain basis. Disclosure of the governance structures and policies of the company, in particular the division of authority between shareholders, management and board members is important for the assessment of a company’s governance.

　　As a matter of transparency, procedures for shareholders meetings should ensure that votes are properly counted and recorded, and that a timely announcement of the outcome is made.

　　治理結(jié)構(gòu)和政策，包括公司治理規(guī)范或政策的詳細(xì)內(nèi)容，以及它們實(shí)施的程序。

　　公司應(yīng)該披露其公司治理方法，這些信息的披露在一些國(guó)家已被規(guī)定為日常公告的一部分。在一些國(guó)家，公司必須貫徹由權(quán)威部門制定或認(rèn)可的公司治理準(zhǔn)則，這些準(zhǔn)則基于遵守或解釋的強(qiáng)制規(guī)定。對(duì)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和制度的披露，特別對(duì)權(quán)利在股東、經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層和董事會(huì)成員間的分布情況的披露對(duì)評(píng)價(jià)公司的治理水平非常重要。

　　根據(jù)透明性原則，股東大會(huì)的舉辦程序應(yīng)該保證選票恰當(dāng)?shù)挠?jì)數(shù)和記錄，并保證選舉結(jié)果及時(shí)公開。

　　B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure.

　　The application of high quality standards is expected to significantly improve the ability of investors to monitor the company by providing increased reliability and comparability of reporting, and improved insight into company performance. The quality of information substantially depends on the standards under which it is compiled and disclosed. The Principles support the development of high quality internationally recognized standards, which can serve to improve transparency and the comparability of financial statements and other financial reporting between countries. Such standards should be developed through open, independent experts. High quality domestic standards can be achieved by making them consistent with one of the internationally recognized accounting standards. In many countries, listed companies are required to use these standards.

　　信息應(yīng)該按照高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)、財(cái)務(wù)和非財(cái)務(wù)公告的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制作和披露。

　　高質(zhì)量的信息披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的采用使公司提供可靠性、可比較性更強(qiáng)的報(bào)告，使投資者可以深入了解公司的業(yè)績(jī)，從而提高了投資者對(duì)公司的監(jiān)管能力。信息披露的質(zhì)量很大程度上依賴于信息編制、披露的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。本準(zhǔn)則致力于發(fā)展高質(zhì)量、國(guó)際承認(rèn)的信息標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可以提高不同國(guó)家間財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的透明性和可比性。這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的編制過程應(yīng)該是公開、獨(dú)立、公眾化的，私營(yíng)部門和其他利益團(tuán)體，如行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)和獨(dú)立專家都應(yīng)參與到這一編制過程中來。各國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的信息質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可以在與國(guó)際承認(rèn)的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則一致的基礎(chǔ)上編制。許多國(guó)家規(guī)定上市公司采用上述標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects.

　　In addition to certifying that the financial statements represent fairly the financial position of a company, the audit statement should also include an opinion on the way in which financial statements have been prepared and presented. This should contribute to an improved control environment in the company.

　　Many countries have introduced measures to improve the independence of auditors and to tighten their accountability to shareholders. A number of countries are tightening audit oversight through an independent entity. Indeed, the Principles of Auditor Oversight issued by IOSCO in 2002 states that effective auditor oversight generally includes, inter alia, mechanisms: to provide that a body, acting in the public interest, provides oversight over the quality and implementation, and ethical standards used in the jurisdiction, as well as audit quality control environment; and to require auditors to be subject to the discipline of an auditor oversight body that is independent of the audit profession, or, if a professional body acts as the oversight body, is overseen by an independent body. It is desirable for such an auditor oversight body to operate in the public interest, and have an appropriate membership, an adequate charter of responsibilities and powers, and adequate funding that is not under the control of the auditing profession, to carry out those responsibilities.

　　年度審計(jì)報(bào)告應(yīng)當(dāng)由獨(dú)立的、有能力的、有資格的審計(jì)師制作，以便給董事會(huì)和股東提供一個(gè)外部的客觀的保證，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告應(yīng)在尊重事實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上公正地描繪公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況和業(yè)績(jī)。

　　審計(jì)報(bào)告可以證明財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表是否真實(shí)的反應(yīng)了公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況，除此之外，審計(jì)報(bào)告中還應(yīng)陳述其對(duì)公司編制撰寫財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表方法的看法。這可以給公司提供一個(gè)良好的管理環(huán)境。

　　許多國(guó)家引進(jìn)了不同的方法來增強(qiáng)審計(jì)人員的獨(dú)立性和其對(duì)股東而言的可信度。其中一些通過引入其他獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)或人員來加強(qiáng)對(duì)審計(jì)人員的監(jiān)督。2002年國(guó)際證監(jiān)會(huì)組織(IOSCO)發(fā)布的《審計(jì)人員監(jiān)督準(zhǔn)則》認(rèn)為有效的審計(jì)人員監(jiān)督工作應(yīng)包括互相制約的機(jī)制：需要代表公眾利益的一方對(duì)審計(jì)的質(zhì)量和執(zhí)行情況進(jìn)行監(jiān)督，并提供評(píng)判的職業(yè)道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及審計(jì)質(zhì)量控制環(huán)境;以及要求審計(jì)人員必須遵從審計(jì)監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)制定的規(guī)章，該監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)可以視為獨(dú)立的審計(jì)行業(yè)從業(yè)者，或者是，一個(gè)如監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的專業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)、同時(shí)被獨(dú)立機(jī)構(gòu)所監(jiān)管。上述審計(jì)監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)最好能代表公眾的利益，由適當(dāng)?shù)某蓡T組成，具有完善的責(zé)任權(quán)利的規(guī)定和不受審計(jì)方面控制的充足資金，以便其更好的開展工作。

　　It is increasingly common for external auditors to be recommended by an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body and to be appointed either by that committee/body or by shareholders directly. Moreover, the IOSCO Principles of Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate Governance in Monitoring an Auditor’s Independence states that, standards of auditor independence should establish a framework of principles, supported by a combination of prohibitions, restrictions, other policies and procedures and disclosures, that addresses at least the following threats to independence: self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation.

　　The audit committee or an equivalent body is often specified as providing oversight of the internal audit activities and should also be charged with overseeing the overall relationship with the external auditor including the nature of non-audit services provided by the auditor to the company can significantly impair their independence and might involve them auditing their own work. To deal with the skewed incentives which may arise, a number of countries now call for disclosure of payments to external auditors for non-audit services. Examples of other provisions to underpin auditor independence include, a total ban or severe limitation on the nature of non-audit work which can be undertaken by an auditor for their audit client, mandatory rotation of auditors (either partners or in some cases the audit partnership), a temporary ban on the employment of an ex-auditor by the audited company and prohibiting auditors or their dependents from having a financial stake or management role in the companies they audit. Some countries take a more direct regulatory approach and limit the percentage of non-audit income that the auditor can receive from a particular client or limit the total percentage of auditor income that can come from one client.

　　An issue which has arisen in some jurisdictions concerns the pressing need to ensure the competence of the audit profession. In many cases there is a registration process for individuals to confirm their qualifications. This needs, however, to be supported by ongoing training and monitoring of work experience to ensure an appropriate level of professional competence.

　　越來越普遍的情況是，外部審計(jì)人員由董事會(huì)所屬的獨(dú)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)或與之相當(dāng)?shù)臋C(jī)構(gòu)推薦，并由那個(gè)委員會(huì)/機(jī)構(gòu)任命、或者由股東直接任命。國(guó)際證監(jiān)會(huì)組織(IOSCO)《關(guān)于審計(jì)人員獨(dú)立性及公司治理在監(jiān)督審計(jì)人員獨(dú)立性中作用的準(zhǔn)則》中有如下敘述：應(yīng)構(gòu)建一個(gè)有關(guān)審計(jì)人員獨(dú)立性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的框架，其中包括各種禁令、限制和其它的程序、制度和披露方法，以防止下述可能威脅審計(jì)人員獨(dú)立性的因素：個(gè)人利益、自我監(jiān)督、熱心主張、親密關(guān)系及恐嚇威脅。

　　審計(jì)委員會(huì)或與之相當(dāng)?shù)臋C(jī)構(gòu)的職責(zé)在于監(jiān)督內(nèi)部審計(jì)工作，并負(fù)責(zé)公司與外部審計(jì)人員的總體關(guān)系，其中包括外部審計(jì)人員向公司提供的非審計(jì)性服務(wù)。外部審計(jì)人員向公司提供非審計(jì)性服務(wù)可能會(huì)顯著削弱其獨(dú)立性并影響到其審計(jì)工作。為防止審計(jì)人員可能產(chǎn)生的這種不良傾向，一些國(guó)家現(xiàn)在要求披露向外部審計(jì)人員支付的非審計(jì)性服務(wù)報(bào)酬。另一些加強(qiáng)審計(jì)人員獨(dú)立性條款的例子包括：全面禁止或嚴(yán)格控制審計(jì)人員向其客戶提供非審計(jì)性工作，強(qiáng)制性的輪換審計(jì)人員(為其合作伙伴，或一些情況下是其合伙的審計(jì)企業(yè))，被審計(jì)公司暫時(shí)不能雇傭其外部審計(jì)者，禁止審計(jì)者及其家屬收受公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)好處或在公司擔(dān)當(dāng)管理職務(wù)。一些國(guó)家制定了更直接的規(guī)定，限制審計(jì)人員從某一客戶獲得的非審計(jì)性收入的比例，或限制其審計(jì)收入中來自某單一客戶的比例。

　　人們逐漸意識(shí)到，保證審計(jì)人員具備足夠的專業(yè)能力成為一種迫切的需要。在一些情況下，需要一個(gè)注冊(cè)過程幫助審計(jì)人員確認(rèn)他們的資格。然而仍需要后續(xù)的培訓(xùn)以及工作經(jīng)歷的監(jiān)控來保證審計(jì)人員具備適當(dāng)水準(zhǔn)的專業(yè)能力以勝任其職業(yè)。

　　D. External auditors should be accountable to he shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit.

　　The practice that external auditors are recommended by an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body and that external auditors are appointed either by that committee/body or by the shareholders’ meeting directly can be regarded as good practice since it clarifies that the external auditor should be accountable to the shareholders. It also underlines that the external auditor owes a duty of due professional care to the company rather that any individual or group of corporate managers that they may interact with for the purpose of their work.

　　外部審計(jì)師應(yīng)對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)，并對(duì)公司負(fù)有義務(wù)，在審計(jì)中具備專業(yè)審慎的素養(yǎng)。

　　外部審計(jì)人員由董事會(huì)所屬的獨(dú)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)或與之相當(dāng)?shù)臋C(jī)構(gòu)推薦，并由其或由股東大會(huì)直接任命是一種很好的方法，因?yàn)樗梢悦鞔_外部審計(jì)人員應(yīng)對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)。它同時(shí)強(qiáng)調(diào)了外部審計(jì)人員應(yīng)具備應(yīng)有的職業(yè)素養(yǎng)和謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度，這是其對(duì)公司負(fù)有的義務(wù)，而不是對(duì)可能與其工作上接觸或合作的公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層或具體管理者。

　　E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.

　　Channels for the dissemination of information can be as important as the content of the information itself. While the disclosure of information is often provided for by legislation, filing and access to information can be cumbersome and costly. Filing of statutory reports has been greatly enhanced in some countries by electronic filing and data retrieval systems. Some countries are now moving to the next stage by integrating different sources of company information, including shareholder filings. The Internet and other information technologies also provide the opportunity for improving information dissemination.

　　A number of countries have introduced provisions for ongoing disclosure (often prescribed by law or by listing rules) which includes periodic disclosure and continuous or current disclosure which must be provided on an ad hoc basis. With respect to continuous/current disclosure, good practice is to call for immediate disclosure of material developments, whether this means as soon as possible or is defined as a prescribed maximum number of specified days. The IOSCO Principles for Ongoing Disclosure and Material Development Reporting by Listed Entities set forth common principles of ongoing disclosure and material development reporting for listed companies.

　　信息傳播的途徑應(yīng)確保信息使用者能夠平等、及時(shí)、便捷地獲取信息。

　　信息的傳播渠道與信息本身同等重要。信息的披露通常有法可依，然而將信息歸檔及獲取信息卻可能成為麻煩和成本高昂的問題。一些國(guó)家采用電子化信息存檔和數(shù)據(jù)修復(fù)系統(tǒng)儲(chǔ)存公司的法定公告。還有一些國(guó)家更進(jìn)一步，將包括股東情況的公司各種信息整合后存檔?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)和其他信息科技提供了增進(jìn)信息傳播的可能。

　　一些國(guó)家增設(shè)了持續(xù)性信息披露的條款(通常為法律規(guī)定或上市公司規(guī)范)，包括定期的信息披露，和在特別的基點(diǎn)上被明確規(guī)定的持續(xù)的或即時(shí)的信息披露。對(duì)于持續(xù)性/即時(shí)性信息披露，無論表述為盡可能快的或是規(guī)定一個(gè)最大時(shí)間期限，最好的方法是立即披露所有重大事態(tài)發(fā)展。國(guó)際證監(jiān)會(huì)組織(IOSCO)《關(guān)于上市公司持續(xù)性披露及重大事態(tài)發(fā)展報(bào)告的原則》闡明了上市公司對(duì)持續(xù)性披露及重大事態(tài)發(fā)展報(bào)告的一般性原則。

　　F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, free from material conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice.

　　In addition to demanding independent and competent auditors, and to facilitate timely dissemination of information, a number of countries have taken steps to ensure the integrity of those professions and activities that serve as conduits of analysis and advice to the market. These intermediaries, if they are operating free from conflicts and with integrity, can play an important role in providing incentives for company boards to follow good corporate governance practices.

　　Concerns have arisen, however, in response to evidence that conflicts of interest often arise and may affect judgement. This could be the case when the provider of advice is also seeking to provide other services to the company in question, or where the provider has a direct material interest in the company or its competitors. The concern identifies a highly relevant dimension of the disclosure and transparency process that targets the professional standards of stock market research analysts, rating agencies, investment banks, etc.

　　Experience in other areas indicates that the preferred solution is to demand full disclosure of conflicts of interest and how the entity is choosing to manage them. Particularly important will be disclosure about how the entity is structuring the incentives of its employees in order to eliminate the potential conflict of interest. Such disclosure allows investors to judge the risks involved and the likely bias in the advice and information. IOSCO has developed statements of principles relating to analysts and rating agencies (IOSCO Statement of Principles for Addressing Sell-side Securities Analyst Conflicts of Interest; IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding the Activivities of Credit Rating Agencies).

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)被一個(gè)有效的方法所補(bǔ)充，這就是提供和推廣分析報(bào)告、或者由分析員、經(jīng)紀(jì)人、評(píng)估中介等提供建議。由于這些分析報(bào)告和建議關(guān)系到投資者的決策，因此在其中不應(yīng)該出現(xiàn)有損于其公正性的重大利益沖突。

　　除了對(duì)審計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性和專業(yè)能力的要求、信息發(fā)布的及時(shí)便捷以外，在很多國(guó)家還同時(shí)采取措施確保中介服務(wù)的真實(shí)可信，這包括專業(yè)化的和活躍的對(duì)市場(chǎng)分析和建議報(bào)告等中介服務(wù)。如果這些中介服務(wù)誠(chéng)實(shí)守信，并且在利益沖突中保持中立，則會(huì)有力的激勵(lì)和促進(jìn)公司董事會(huì)遵循良好的公司治理原則。

　　但我們也應(yīng)該注意到，利益沖突經(jīng)常發(fā)生，并且影響到?jīng)Q策判斷，比如供意見的人還想爭(zhēng)取到該公司更多的業(yè)務(wù)，或者是他們與該公司或其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手存在直接的重大利益。同時(shí)也發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司和企業(yè)的信息披露與透明度常常是為了迎合證券市場(chǎng)分析師、評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)、投資銀行的專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明，最好的解決辦法是披露所有的利益沖突和處理過程。尤其重要的是，披露為了消除利益沖突而對(duì)員工采取的激勵(lì)措施。這些披露使得投資者得以判斷在市場(chǎng)建議報(bào)告和信息中潛在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和可能存在的偏差。國(guó)際證監(jiān)會(huì)組織(IOSCO)已經(jīng)制定了關(guān)于分析師和評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)的原則框架，即國(guó)際證監(jiān)會(huì)組織(IOSCO)《關(guān)于銷售方證券分析人員利益沖突的處理準(zhǔn)則》和《關(guān)于信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)行為的指導(dǎo)準(zhǔn)則》。

　　VI. The Responsibilities of the Board董事會(huì)的責(zé)任

　　The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.

　　Board structures and procedures vary both within and among OECD countries. Some countries have two-tier boards that separate the supervisory function and the management function into different bodies. Such systems typically have a supervision board composed of non-executive board members and a management board composed entirely of executives. Other countries have unitary boards, which bring together executive and non-executive board members. In some countries there is also an additional statutory body for audit purposes. The Principles are intended to be sufficiently general to apply to whatever board structure is charged with the functions of governing the enterprise and monitoring management.

　　Together with guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly responsible for monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for shareholders, while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation. In order for boards to effectively fulfil their responsibilities they must be able to exercise objective and independent judgement. Another important board responsibility is to oversee systems designed to ensure that the corporation obeys applicable laws, including tax, competition, labour, environment, equal opportunity, health and safety laws. In some countries, companies have found it useful to explicitly articulate the responsibilities that the board assumes and those for which management is accountable.

　　The board is not only accountable to the company and its shareholders but also has a duty to act in their best interests. In addition, boards are expected to take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder interests including those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities. Observance of environmental and social standards is relevant in this context.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)確保董事會(huì)對(duì)公司的戰(zhàn)略指導(dǎo)和對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的有效監(jiān)督,同時(shí)確保董事會(huì)對(duì)公司和股東的責(zé)任和忠誠(chéng)。

　　董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)和運(yùn)作程序無論在OECD成員國(guó)內(nèi)部還是成員國(guó)間都存在差異。一些國(guó)家采用將監(jiān)督職能與管理職能分離的二級(jí)董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)，一般來說，此結(jié)構(gòu)包括了由非執(zhí)行董事組成的監(jiān)督董事會(huì)和全部由執(zhí)行董事組成的管理董事會(huì)。另外一些國(guó)家則采用既包括執(zhí)行董事又包括非執(zhí)行董事的單級(jí)董事會(huì)。在一些國(guó)家里還具有司職審計(jì)的部門。本準(zhǔn)則的目標(biāo)是普遍適用于各種企業(yè)治理職能和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層監(jiān)督職能下的董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)。

　　董事會(huì)除了指導(dǎo)公司戰(zhàn)略，還主要負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)督經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層和確保股東回報(bào)，同時(shí)避免各種利益沖突，平衡各方需求。為了有效地完成以上職責(zé)，董事會(huì)必須具備客觀獨(dú)立的判斷力。董事會(huì)另外的重要職責(zé)是，監(jiān)督確保公司運(yùn)作符合現(xiàn)行法律法規(guī)，這些法律法規(guī)涵蓋多個(gè)方面，包括稅收、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、勞資、環(huán)境、公平發(fā)展、健康和安全等等。在一些國(guó)家中，公司和企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)清晰準(zhǔn)確地描述和劃分董事會(huì)和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層職責(zé)會(huì)帶來很多益處。

　　董事會(huì)不僅要對(duì)公司和股東負(fù)責(zé)，同時(shí)有義務(wù)將其利益最大化。董事會(huì)還被寄希望于承擔(dān)起兼顧和公平對(duì)待其他利益相關(guān)者利益的職責(zé)，這些利益相關(guān)者包括員工、債權(quán)人、客戶、供應(yīng)商和當(dāng)?shù)厣鐣?huì)。在這個(gè)范圍內(nèi)，他們還必須遵守環(huán)境和社會(huì)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.

　　In some countries, the board is legally required to act in the interest of the company, taking into account the interests of shareholders, employees, and the public good. Acting in the best interest of the company should not permit management to become entrenched.

　　This principle states the two key elements of the fiduciary duty of board members: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires board members to act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care. In some jurisdictions there is a standard of reference which is the behaviour that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances. In nearly all jurisdictions, the duty of care does not extend to errors of business judgement so long as board members are not grossly negligent and a decision is made with due diligence etc. The principle calls for board members to act on a fully informed basis. Good practice takes this to mean that they should be satisfied that key corporate information and compliance systems are fundamentally sound and underpin the key monitoring role of the board advocated by the Principles. In many jurisdictions this meaning is already considered an element of the duty of care, while in others it is required by securities regulation, accounting standards etc. The duty of loyalty is of central importance, since it underpins effective implementation of other principles in this document relating to, for example, the equitable treatment of shareholders, monitoring of related party transactions and the establishment of remuneration policy for key executives and board members. It is also a key principle for board members who are working within the structure of a group of companies: even though a company might be controlled by another enterprise, the duty of loyalty for a board member relates to the company and all its shareholders and not to the controlling company of the group.

　　董事會(huì)成員的行為應(yīng)當(dāng)建立在一個(gè)充分可靠信息的基礎(chǔ)上，忠實(shí)誠(chéng)信、勤勉盡責(zé)、根據(jù)公司和股東的最大利益履行職責(zé)。

　　一些國(guó)家的法律規(guī)定，董事會(huì)應(yīng)該根據(jù)公司利益行事，同時(shí)兼顧股東、員工和公共事務(wù)等，防止經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層侵占公司最大利益。

　　本準(zhǔn)則闡述了董事會(huì)成員受托責(zé)任的兩個(gè)重要方面：謹(jǐn)慎和忠實(shí)。謹(jǐn)慎責(zé)任要求董事會(huì)成員基于完全信息，忠實(shí)、誠(chéng)信、勤勉和審慎地履行職責(zé)。一些法律法規(guī)涉及了在特定或類似環(huán)境中，謹(jǐn)慎行為的衡量尺度。只要董事會(huì)成員沒有過分的疏忽，并且勤勉地履行職責(zé)，絕大多數(shù)法律法規(guī)都不把他們?cè)谏虡I(yè)決策中的失誤和謹(jǐn)慎責(zé)任相聯(lián)系。本準(zhǔn)則要求董事會(huì)成員履行完全的信息披露義務(wù)，實(shí)踐表明，董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)當(dāng)樂于看到關(guān)鍵和符合公司實(shí)際的信息被原原本本地披露，他們也應(yīng)該加強(qiáng)本準(zhǔn)則倡導(dǎo)的董事會(huì)監(jiān)管職能。很多法律法規(guī)已經(jīng)將此視為謹(jǐn)慎責(zé)任的要素，還有一些則用證券監(jiān)管法規(guī)和會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則等來約束。忠實(shí)責(zé)任至關(guān)重要，因?yàn)樗潜疚募邢嚓P(guān)的一些其他準(zhǔn)則有效實(shí)行的前提和基礎(chǔ)，這些原則包括平等對(duì)待股東、監(jiān)管關(guān)聯(lián)交易和建立合理的關(guān)鍵的經(jīng)營(yíng)人員及董事會(huì)成員的薪酬體制。忠實(shí)責(zé)任對(duì)在一個(gè)集團(tuán)公司結(jié)構(gòu)內(nèi)的董事會(huì)成員也非常重要，即使一家公司被其他的企業(yè)控制，忠實(shí)原則要求董事會(huì)成員對(duì)本公司和本公司股東負(fù)責(zé)，而非對(duì)控制方負(fù)責(zé)。

　　B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholders groups differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly.

　　In carrying out its duties, the board should not be viewed, or act, as an assembly of individual representatives for various constituencies. While specific board members may indeed be nominated or elected by certain shareholders (and sometimes contested by others) it is an important feature of the board’s work that board members when they assume their responsibilities carry out their duties in an even-handed manner with respect to all shareholders. This principle is particularly important to establish in the presence of controlling shareholders that de facto may be able to select all board members.

　　如果董事會(huì)的決策可能對(duì)不同的股東團(tuán)體產(chǎn)生不同影響，董事會(huì)應(yīng)平等地對(duì)待所有股東。

　　在履行其職責(zé)時(shí)，董事會(huì)不應(yīng)被視作、也不應(yīng)被當(dāng)作不同支持者的個(gè)別代表的集合體。盡管個(gè)別董事會(huì)成員可能確系部分股東提名選出(有時(shí)候被其他股東爭(zhēng)奪)，讓董事會(huì)成員承擔(dān)起他們的職責(zé)而以一個(gè)尊重所有股東的公平方式履行他們的義務(wù)，這確實(shí)是董事會(huì)工作的一個(gè)重要作用。如果控股股東存在，而他又能夠在事實(shí)上選取所有董事會(huì)成員，那么該原則就尤為重要。

　　C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests of stakeholders.

　　The board has a key role in setting the ethical tone of a company, not only by its own actions, but also in appointing and overseeing key executives and consequently the management in general. High ethical standards are in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments. To make the objectives of the board clear and operational, many companies have found it useful to develop company codes of conduct based on, inter alia, professional standards and sometimes broader codes of behaviour. The latter might include a voluntary commitment by the company (including its subsidiaries) to comply with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which reflect all four principles contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Labour Rights.

　　Company-wide codes serve as a standard for conduct by both the board and key executives, setting the framework for the exercise of judgement in dealing with varying and often conflicting constituencies. At a minimum, the ethical code should set clear limits on the pursuit of private interests, including dealings in the shares of the company. An overall framework for ethical conduct goes beyond compliance with the law, which should always be a fundamental requirement.

　　董事會(huì)應(yīng)該具有很高的倫理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。它應(yīng)當(dāng)充分考慮到利益相關(guān)者的利益。

　　董事會(huì)在塑造整個(gè)公司的道德倫理形象中發(fā)揮著關(guān)鍵性作用，他們不僅要身體力行，同時(shí)還要約束和監(jiān)督關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員和整個(gè)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層。高度的道德倫理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)符合公司的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益，它會(huì)在日常運(yùn)作和長(zhǎng)期合作中為公司贏得信譽(yù)和誠(chéng)信。為了使董事會(huì)目標(biāo)清楚而且切實(shí)可行，很多公司建立了基于專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和更廣泛行為準(zhǔn)則的規(guī)章制度。更廣泛的行為準(zhǔn)則可能包括公司和他的下屬企業(yè)自愿遵守OECD《跨國(guó)企業(yè)指引》，該指引體現(xiàn)了國(guó)際勞工組織(ILO)的《勞動(dòng)者基本權(quán)利宣言》中所包含的四項(xiàng)核心準(zhǔn)則。

　　公司的這些規(guī)章制度為解決不同股東間的矛盾沖突提供了原則，也為董事會(huì)和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員的行為提供了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。至少，這些道德倫理規(guī)范會(huì)明確限制包括在公司股份交易上的某些攫取個(gè)人利益行為。盡管法律約束是根本性的約束，但道德倫理行為框架本身已經(jīng)超越了僅僅遵守法律的界限。

　　D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including:

　　1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.

　　An area of increasing importance for boards and which is closely related to corporate strategy is risk policy. Such policy will involve specifying the types and degree of risk that a company is willing to accept in pursuit of its goals. It is thus a crucial guideline for management that must manage risks to meet the company’s desired risk profile.

　　董事會(huì)應(yīng)該履行以下一些關(guān)鍵職能：

　　i. 審查和指導(dǎo)制定公司戰(zhàn)略、重要的行動(dòng)計(jì)劃、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)策、年度預(yù)算和商業(yè)計(jì)劃、制定績(jī)效目標(biāo)、監(jiān)督目標(biāo)的執(zhí)行和企業(yè)績(jī)效的實(shí)現(xiàn)、監(jiān)督重要的資金支出、收購和出售等行為。

　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)策不僅與公司戰(zhàn)略密切相關(guān)，而且越來越受到董事會(huì)的關(guān)注。該對(duì)策包括確認(rèn)公司為了達(dá)到其目標(biāo)而能夠接受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類別和程度，因而對(duì)進(jìn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理使風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不超出預(yù)期水平的管理者來說非常重要。

　　2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making changes as needed.

　　Monitoring of governance by the board also includes continuous review of the internal structure of the company to ensure that there are clear lines of accountability for management throughout the organisation. In addition to requiring the monitoring and disclosure of corporate governance practices on a regular basis, a number of countries have moved to recommend or indeed mandate self-assessment by boards of their performance as well as performance reviews of individual board members and the CEO/Chairman.

　　監(jiān)控公司的治理實(shí)踐成效，在需要的時(shí)候加以方向上的干預(yù)。

　　董事會(huì)對(duì)公司治理的監(jiān)督包括：不斷的審核公司內(nèi)部制度，以確保所有管理者的責(zé)任清晰。很多國(guó)家除了要求定期對(duì)公司治理實(shí)際情況的監(jiān)督和公開披露外，還建議甚至規(guī)定董事會(huì)要對(duì)自身運(yùn)作、董事會(huì)成員以及首席執(zhí)行官或董事長(zhǎng)進(jìn)行評(píng)估。

　　3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning.

　　In two tier board systems the supervisory board is also responsible for appointing the management board which will normally comprise most of the key executives.

　　選擇、確定報(bào)酬、監(jiān)控關(guān)鍵的經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員，在必要的時(shí)候、更換關(guān)鍵的經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員;監(jiān)督更替計(jì)劃。

　　在二級(jí)結(jié)構(gòu)的董事會(huì)中，監(jiān)督董事會(huì)同時(shí)負(fù)責(zé)指定一般情況下有大多數(shù)主要經(jīng)營(yíng)人員組成的管理董事會(huì)。

　　4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders.

　　In an increasing number of countries it is regarded as good practice for boards to develop and disclose a remuneration policy statement covering board members and key executives. Such policy statements specify the relationship between remuneration and performance, and include measurable standards that emphasis the longer run interests of the company over short term considerations. Policy statements generally tend to set conditions for payments to board members for extra-board activities, such as consulting. They also often specify terms to be observed by board members and key executives about holding and trading the stock of the company, and the procedures to be followed in granting and re-pricing of options. In some countries, policy also covers the payments to be made when terminating the contract of an executive.

　　It is considered good practice in an increasing number of countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives be handled by a special committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of independent directors. There are also calls for a remuneration committee that excludes executives that serve on each others’ remuneration committees, which could lead to conflicts of interest.

　　協(xié)調(diào)關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員和董事會(huì)的薪酬，使之與公司和股東長(zhǎng)期利益保持一致。

　　在越來越多的國(guó)家中，董事會(huì)制定和披露董事以及關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員的薪酬政策被視為有益的實(shí)踐。該薪酬政策明確了管理者業(yè)績(jī)和報(bào)酬間的關(guān)系，同時(shí)制定了強(qiáng)調(diào)長(zhǎng)期利益而非短期績(jī)效的評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，在通常情況下，對(duì)公司董事從事咨詢服務(wù)等與董事會(huì)無關(guān)活動(dòng)的酬勞，設(shè)置了一定的條件。該政策還常常對(duì)董事會(huì)成員和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員持有和交易公司股票指定需要遵守的期限，以及明確對(duì)期權(quán)授予和重定價(jià)的過程。在某些國(guó)家里，還包含與高管人員解除合同的給付政策。

　　在越來越多的國(guó)家中，由全部或大部分獨(dú)立董事組成的委員會(huì)來管理薪酬政策和對(duì)董事和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員的聘請(qǐng)，這被視為有益的實(shí)踐。同時(shí)，也要求薪酬委員會(huì)拒絕不同公司的關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員相互擔(dān)任對(duì)方薪酬委員會(huì)委員，因?yàn)檫@將導(dǎo)致利益沖突。

　　5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process

　　These Principles promote an active role for shareholders in the nomination and election of board members. The board has an essential role to play in ensuring that this and other aspects of the nominations and election process are respected. First, while actual procedures for nomination may differ among countries, the board or a nomination committee has a special responsibility to make sure that established procedures are transparent and respected. Second, the board has a key role in identifying potential members for the board with the appropriate knowledge, competencies and expertise to complement the existing skills of the board and thereby improve its value-adding potential for the company. In several countries there are calls for an open search process extending to a broad range of people.

　　保證董事會(huì)的選聘和任命過程的正規(guī)化、透明性。

　　這些準(zhǔn)則促進(jìn)了股東在提名和選舉董事會(huì)成員中的積極作用。董事會(huì)在確保提名和選舉過程受到普遍認(rèn)可方面發(fā)揮著至關(guān)重要的作用。首先，盡管各個(gè)國(guó)家提名過程有所不同，董事會(huì)或提名委員會(huì)有特殊的義務(wù)確保提名過程透明并受到普遍認(rèn)可。其次，在發(fā)掘具有合適知識(shí)水平、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和專業(yè)知識(shí)，能夠?yàn)楣驹黾觾r(jià)值的董事會(huì)成員方面，董事會(huì)也起到了核心作用。在一些國(guó)家，要求在更大的范圍內(nèi)公開尋找合適的被提名者。

　　6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions.

　　It is an important function of the board to oversee the internal control systems covering financial reporting and the use of corporate assets and to guard against abusive related party transactions. These functions are sometimes assigned to the internal auditor which should maintain direct access to the board. Where other corporate officers are responsible such as the general counsel, it is important that they maintain similar reporting responsibilities as the internal auditor.

　　In fulfilling its control oversight responsibilities it is important for the board to encourage the reporting of unethical/unlawful behaviour without fear of retribution. The existence of a company code of ethics should aid this process which should be underpinned by legal protection for the individuals concerned. In a number of companies either the audit committee or an ethics committee is specified as the contact point for employees who wish to report concerns about unethical or illegal behaviour that might also compromise the integrity of financial statements.

　　監(jiān)管經(jīng)營(yíng)層、董事會(huì)成員和股東之間的潛在的利益沖突，這包括公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的濫用和關(guān)聯(lián)交易中的舞弊行為。

　　監(jiān)督包含財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和公司資產(chǎn)的使用在內(nèi)的內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)，避免關(guān)聯(lián)交易中的舞弊行為也是董事會(huì)的重要職能。該職能有時(shí)由直接向董事會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)的內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員來執(zhí)行。但這也是十分重要的，就是當(dāng)其他的企業(yè)官員有責(zé)任提出一般性建議時(shí)，他們同樣具有像內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員一樣向董事會(huì)報(bào)告相關(guān)問題的重要職責(zé)。

　　為了完成其有效控制的職責(zé)，董事會(huì)鼓勵(lì)不怕報(bào)復(fù)、舉報(bào)非法和不道德行為將是十分重要的。公司有關(guān)于道德方面的規(guī)章制度應(yīng)該支持這種舉報(bào)行為，同時(shí)對(duì)個(gè)人予以法律保護(hù)。在很多公司，是由審計(jì)委員會(huì)或道德委員會(huì)直接受理員工關(guān)于非法和不道德行為的舉報(bào)，有時(shí)這些報(bào)告還關(guān)乎財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的可信性。

　　7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.

　　Ensuring the integrity of the essential reporting and monitoring systems will require the board to set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. The board will also need to ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management. One way of doing this is through an internal audit system directly reporting to the board. In some jurisdictions it is considered good practice for the internal auditors to report to an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body which is also responsible for managing the relationship with the external auditor, thereby allowing a coordinated response by the board. It should also be regarded as good practice for this committee, or equivalent body, to review and report to the board the most critical accounting policies which are the basis for financial reports. However, the board should retain final responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the reporting systems. Some countries have provided for the chair of the board to report on the internal control process.

　　Companies are also well advised to set up internal programmes and procedures to promote compliance with applicable laws, regulations and standards, including statutes to criminalize bribery of foreign officials that are required to be enacted by the OECD Anti-bribery Convention and measures designed to control other forms of bribery and corruption. Moreover, compliance must also relate to other laws and regulations such as those covering securities, competition and work and safety conditions. Such compliance programmes will also underpin the company’s ethical code. To be effective, the incentive structure of the business needs to be aligned with its ethical and professional standards so that adherence to these values is rewarded and breached of law are met with dissuasive consequences or penalties. Compliance programme should also extend where possible to subsidiaries.

　　確保公司的會(huì)計(jì)、財(cái)務(wù)(包括獨(dú)立的審計(jì))報(bào)告的真實(shí)性，確保恰當(dāng)?shù)目刂葡到y(tǒng)到位，特別是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理系統(tǒng)、財(cái)務(wù)和運(yùn)作控制，確保按照法律和相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)執(zhí)行。

　　為了確?；緢?bào)告和監(jiān)督系統(tǒng)的真實(shí)性，董事會(huì)要在整個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)明確和執(zhí)行清晰的責(zé)任義務(wù)。董事會(huì)也要接受高級(jí)管理人員的適當(dāng)監(jiān)督。一種方式是通過直接向董事會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)的內(nèi)部審計(jì)系統(tǒng)，內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員直接向董事會(huì)的一個(gè)獨(dú)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)報(bào)告，或者向類似協(xié)調(diào)外部審計(jì)關(guān)系的機(jī)構(gòu)報(bào)告，這些機(jī)構(gòu)有時(shí)可以做出和董事會(huì)類似的反饋。審計(jì)委員會(huì)或類似機(jī)構(gòu)審閱并向董事會(huì)報(bào)告作為財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告基礎(chǔ)的關(guān)鍵會(huì)計(jì)政策也被視為有益實(shí)踐，然而，董事會(huì)應(yīng)該對(duì)于確保財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告系統(tǒng)的真實(shí)性承擔(dān)最終責(zé)任。一些國(guó)家要求董事長(zhǎng)對(duì)內(nèi)部控制過程負(fù)責(zé)。

　　公司還被鼓勵(lì)建立一些內(nèi)部程序，用以強(qiáng)化其遵守法律、法規(guī)和相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這還包括OECD《反腐敗協(xié)定》規(guī)定的禁止向國(guó)外官員行賄條款，和一些其他的旨在防止行賄受賄的條款。除此之外，還要遵守關(guān)于證券、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、工作和安全條件等一系列法律法規(guī)。這些程序的建立也加強(qiáng)了公司用以強(qiáng)化道德觀念的規(guī)章制度。為了有效地實(shí)施，激勵(lì)體系一定要給予遵守這些道德觀念和職業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的行為以獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，讓違背者承擔(dān)后果并受到懲罰。這些內(nèi)部程序還應(yīng)盡可能地在子公司實(shí)施。

　　8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications

　　The functions and responsibilities of the board and management with respect to disclosure and communication need to be clearly established by the board. In some companies there is now an investment relations officer who reports directly to the board.

　　監(jiān)督信息披露和對(duì)外溝通的過程。

　　董事會(huì)需要明確建立其自身和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層關(guān)于信息披露和交流的職能與責(zé)任。在一些公司中，現(xiàn)在已設(shè)立直接向董事會(huì)匯報(bào)的投資關(guān)系專員。

　　E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs.

　　In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances usually requires that a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management. In a number of countries with single tier board systems, the objectivity of the board and its independence from management may be strengthened by the separation of the role of chief executive and chairman, or, if these roles are combined, by designating a lead non-executive director to convene or chair sessions of the outside directors. Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve the board’s capacity for decision making independent of management. The designation of a lead director is also regarded as a good practice alternative in some jurisdictions. Such mechanisms can also help to ensure high quality governance of the enterprise and the effective functioning of the board. The Chairman or lead director may, in some countries, be supported by a company secretary. In the case of two tier board systems, consideration should be given to whether corporate governance concerns might arise if there is a tradition for the head of the lower board becoming the Chairman of the Supervisory Board on retirement.

　　The manner in which board objectivity might be underpinned also depends on the ownership structure of the company. A dominant shareholder has considerable powers to appoint the board and the management. However, in this case, the board still has a fiduciary responsibility to the company and to all shareholders including minority shareholders.

　　董事會(huì)對(duì)公司事務(wù)，應(yīng)該能夠行使客觀獨(dú)立的判斷。

　　為了執(zhí)行其監(jiān)督經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層、防止利益沖突、平衡公司內(nèi)部各種需求的職能，董事會(huì)要有能力做出客觀的判斷。首先這意味著董事會(huì)在組成和結(jié)構(gòu)上，對(duì)于經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的獨(dú)立性和客觀性。在這種條件下，董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性要求有足夠數(shù)量的董事會(huì)成員獨(dú)立于經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層。在很多國(guó)家的單一董事會(huì)體系中，董事長(zhǎng)和首席執(zhí)行官的角色分離，或是在不分離的條件下，指定一名非執(zhí)行管理人員或外部人員為首席董事來召集董事會(huì)，這種做法有助于董事會(huì)對(duì)于經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的獨(dú)立性和客觀性。這種角色分離可以幫助平衡權(quán)利，強(qiáng)化董事會(huì)的責(zé)任和獨(dú)立于經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的判斷能力，從而被認(rèn)為是有價(jià)值的實(shí)踐。上述指定首席董事的做法也被視為另一種有價(jià)值的實(shí)踐。這些措施也可以同時(shí)幫助建立高質(zhì)量的公司治理和確保董事會(huì)職能的有效實(shí)施。一些國(guó)家中，董事長(zhǎng)或首席董事的工作會(huì)得到公司秘書的支持。在雙層董事會(huì)體系中，當(dāng)管理董事會(huì)的最高掌權(quán)者退休后成為監(jiān)督董事會(huì)的董事長(zhǎng)的做法成為傳統(tǒng)時(shí)，人們更關(guān)注這是否對(duì)公司治理產(chǎn)生影響。

　　董事會(huì)的客觀性還取決于公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。一個(gè)控股股東在董事會(huì)和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的人事安排上有很大的影響力，然而，即使在此種情況下，董事會(huì)仍然要對(duì)整個(gè)公司和包括小股東在內(nèi)的所有股東恪守盡責(zé)。

　　The variety of board structures, ownership patterns and practices in different countries will thus require different approaches to the issue of board objectivity. In many instances objectivity requires that a sufficient number of board members not be employed by the company or its affiliates and not be closely related to the company or its management through significant economic, family or other ties. This does not prevent shareholders from being board members. In others, independence from controlling shareholders or another controlling body will need to be emphasized, in particular if the ex-ante rights of minority shareholders are weak and opportunities to obtain redress are limited. This has led to both codes and the law in some jurisdictions to call for some board members to be independent of dominant shareholders, independence extending to not being their representative or having close business ties with them. In other cases, parties such as particular creditors can also exercise significant influence. Where there is a party in a special position to influence the company, there should be stringent tests to ensure the objective judgement of the board.

　　In defining independent members of the board, some national principles of corporate governance have specified quite detailed presumptions for non-independence which are frequently reflected in listing requirements. While establishing necessary conditions, such negative criteria defining when an individual is not regarded as independent can usefully be complemented by ‘positive’ examples of qualities that will increase the probability of effective independence.

　　Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-making of the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the performance of the board and management. In addition, they can play an important role in areas where the interests of management, the company and its shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, succession planning, changes of corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisitions and the audit function. In order for them to play this key role, it is desirable that boards declare who they consider to be independent and the criterion for this judgement.

　　在不同的國(guó)家所具有的不同董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司所有權(quán)形式和不同的實(shí)踐方式，需要通過不同的途徑達(dá)到客觀性要求。很多情況下，為了保證客觀性，則要求一定數(shù)量的董事會(huì)成員不得被本公司或分支機(jī)構(gòu)雇用，不得通過重要商業(yè)的、家庭的及其他的連帶關(guān)系與本公司或其經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層發(fā)生緊密聯(lián)系。這并不制止股東成為董事會(huì)成員。在其他情況下，尤其是如果小股東的權(quán)利被削弱、獲得補(bǔ)償?shù)臋C(jī)會(huì)被限制的情況下，相對(duì)于控股股東和控股機(jī)構(gòu)的獨(dú)立性則尤為重要。這也促成了要求一些董事會(huì)成員獨(dú)立于控股股東的法律與法規(guī)的制定，在這些法律法規(guī)中，獨(dú)立性不僅要求董事會(huì)不能僅僅作為控股股東利益的代表，而且不能與之有緊密的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系。在其他一些情況下，諸如特殊的債權(quán)人群體也具有較大的影響力。在對(duì)公司有特殊影響的團(tuán)體存在之處，更要有嚴(yán)格的考核制度來確保董事會(huì)的客觀決策。

　　在定義獨(dú)立董事時(shí)，一些國(guó)家的公司治理準(zhǔn)則制定了非常詳盡的細(xì)則，用所羅列的要求來推斷經(jīng)常需要反省的非獨(dú)立性。只有建立了必要的條件，當(dāng)某些個(gè)人被視為獨(dú)立性不足時(shí)，這種負(fù)面的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)定義才能夠有效地被正面的品質(zhì)范例所補(bǔ)救，從而增加獨(dú)立性的有效比例。

　　獨(dú)立董事可以對(duì)董事會(huì)的決策產(chǎn)生重大影響。并對(duì)于評(píng)價(jià)董事會(huì)和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)帶來客觀的視角。他們還在經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層、公司和股東利益發(fā)生分歧時(shí)發(fā)揮重要作用，這些分歧包括經(jīng)營(yíng)人員的薪酬、經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層交替計(jì)劃、公司控制權(quán)的改變、反收購行為、大規(guī)模的收購和審計(jì)等。為了使獨(dú)立董事發(fā)揮好這些關(guān)鍵作用，董事會(huì)需要公布獨(dú)立董事名單以及挑選獨(dú)立董事的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and board remuneration.

　　Where the responsibility for financial reporting, remuneration and nomination are frequently those of the board as a whole, independent non-executive board members can provide additional assurance to market participants that their interests are defended. The board may also consider establishing specific committees to consider questions where there is a potential for conflict of interest. These committees may require a minimum number or be composed entirely of non-executive members. In some countries, shareholders have direct responsibility for nominating and electing non-executive directors to specialized functions.

　　董事會(huì)應(yīng)該考慮指派足夠數(shù)量的、有能力的非執(zhí)行董事，對(duì)潛在的利益沖突的事項(xiàng)行使客觀獨(dú)立判斷的任務(wù)。這些關(guān)鍵的責(zé)任例子是確保財(cái)務(wù)和非財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的完整性、審核關(guān)聯(lián)交易、任命董事會(huì)成員、確定關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員和董事會(huì)的報(bào)酬等。

　　當(dāng)關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告、薪酬和提名任命等責(zé)任集于董事會(huì)一身時(shí)，獨(dú)立非執(zhí)行董事往往可以為市場(chǎng)參與者的利益提供額外保障。董事會(huì)還可以成立專門的委員會(huì)處理潛在的利益沖突。此委員會(huì)中的委員如果不是全部也至少要達(dá)到一定數(shù)量的非執(zhí)行成員。在一些國(guó)家當(dāng)中，對(duì)提名和選舉特殊職能的非執(zhí)行董事，股東具有直接責(zé)任。

　　2. When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board.

　　While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is particularly important in the increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent audit committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions.

　　當(dāng)董事會(huì)專業(yè)委員會(huì)設(shè)立時(shí)，他們的任命、構(gòu)成和工作程序應(yīng)該定義明確并由董事會(huì)公告。

　　盡管一些特殊的委員會(huì)有助于董事會(huì)的工作，但是它們也會(huì)給董事會(huì)和董事會(huì)成員帶來麻煩。為了評(píng)估這些專門委員會(huì)，市場(chǎng)需要清晰地了解他們的目標(biāo)、職責(zé)和組成。尤其當(dāng)董事會(huì)建立獨(dú)立的審計(jì)委員會(huì)，并賦予越來越多的權(quán)限范圍和越來越大的權(quán)力來審查與外部審計(jì)人員關(guān)系和在許多案例中獨(dú)立行動(dòng)時(shí)，這些信息的披露尤為重要。其他類似的委員會(huì)包括，處理提名和賠償?shù)奈瘑T會(huì)等。董事會(huì)部分的和整體的責(zé)任應(yīng)當(dāng)被區(qū)分明確。信息披露不應(yīng)擴(kuò)展到委員會(huì)提供的商業(yè)交易秘密等事項(xiàng)。

　　3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities

　　Service on too many boards can interfere with the performance of board members. Companies may wish to consider whether multiple board memberships by the same person are compatible with effective board performance and disclose the information to shareholders. Some countries have limited the number of board positions that can be held. Specific limitations may be less important than ensuring that members of the board enjoy legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of shareholders. Achieving legitimacy would also be facilitated by the publication of attendance records for individual board members (e.g. whether they have missed a significant number of meetings) and any other work undertaken on behalf of the board and the associated remuneration.

　　In order to improve board practices and the performance of its members, an increasing number of jurisdictions are now encouraging companies to engage in board training and voluntary self-evaluation that meets the needs of the individual company. This might include that board members acquire appropriate skills upon appointment, and thereafter remain abreast of relevant new laws, regulations, and changing commercial risks through in-house training and external courses.

　　董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)該承諾有效地履行他們的職責(zé)。

　　在過多的董事會(huì)中任職，會(huì)影響董事會(huì)成員履行職責(zé)。公司會(huì)考慮董事的多重身份是否會(huì)影響董事會(huì)的有效運(yùn)作，并向股東披露有關(guān)信息。在一些國(guó)家中，董事會(huì)成員的數(shù)量受到限制，這種限制仍保持著。但這些限制仍不及董事會(huì)成員的合法性和在股東眼中的信任重要。公開披露董事參加董事會(huì)的記錄(他們是否缺席重要的董事會(huì)議)、董事作為公司董事會(huì)代表的行為以及他們的薪酬情況，都有助于合法性的實(shí)現(xiàn)。

　　為了改善董事會(huì)的運(yùn)作及其成員的績(jī)效，越來越多的公司正在鼓勵(lì)培訓(xùn)其董事會(huì)成員，并在個(gè)別公司中鼓勵(lì)董事會(huì)成員進(jìn)行自我評(píng)定。培訓(xùn)包括董事會(huì)成員獲得適應(yīng)其職位的技能、熟知法律的變化和規(guī)章制度的調(diào)整、識(shí)別和控制不斷變化的商業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這些培訓(xùn)有時(shí)在內(nèi)部進(jìn)行，有時(shí)通過外部授課或輔導(dǎo)來實(shí)現(xiàn)。

　　B. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, relevant and timely information.

　　Board members require relevant information on a timely basis in order to support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information.

　　為了履行他們的職責(zé)，董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)該有渠道掌握準(zhǔn)確的、關(guān)鍵、及時(shí)的信息。

　　董事會(huì)成員需要掌握及時(shí)、關(guān)鍵的信息以做出市場(chǎng)決策。非執(zhí)行董事和重要管理人員相比并不熟知企業(yè)信息。讓他們和諸如公司秘書、內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員等的重要管理者接觸，并借助于公司外部對(duì)于公司開支的獨(dú)立建議，則有助于非執(zhí)行董事發(fā)揮作用。為了履行他們的職能，董事會(huì)成員要確保其信息的準(zhǔn)確、切中要點(diǎn)和及時(shí)。