Free exchange
自由交流
The death of inflation
通貨膨脹的終結(jié)
Central banks in the rich world may have been too successful in subduing price pressures
發(fā)達國家的中央銀行抑制價格舉動或許用力過猛。
IT TOOK an iron will (and a handbag) to beat the inflation of the 1970s. Under Margaret Thatcher the British government squeezed the economy with high interest rates until the beast submitted. The Federal Reserve, then led by Paul Volcker, followed suit. Such displays of fortitude convinced markets that governments were serious about keeping inflation low. Expectations of future price increases converged around central-bank targets, touching off an era of long expansions and mild recessions. Yet relative price stability may now be adding to the rich world’s economic woes.
鋼鐵般的意志(以及一只手提袋)成功抑制了上世紀70年代的通貨膨脹�，敻覃愄�•撒切爾治下的英國政府采用高利率的經(jīng)濟政策壓低經(jīng)濟增長率，直至通脹巨獸束手就擒。其時由保羅•沃克爾主導(dǎo)的美國聯(lián)邦儲蓄銀行在抑制通脹方面的政策緊隨其后。政府在此期間所展現(xiàn)的勇氣和決斷使市場確信政府會豪不手軟地壓低通貨膨脹率。未來價格增幅預(yù)期唯央行通脹目標是瞻，由此觸發(fā)了一個經(jīng)濟長期擴張但偶有溫和衰退的時代。但是，相對的價格穩(wěn)定性目前對于發(fā)達國家的經(jīng)濟狀況來說不啻于一個困境。
Deep recessions like the recent global contraction would normally be expected to send inflation tumbling. Workless labourers ought to reduce wage demands to find employment; firms with unsold goods should slash prices to clear inventories. There was every reason to expect that inflation would go to zero or even enter negative territory in recent years. In April 2009 the International Monetary Fund forecast that inflation in that year would be -0.2% for advanced economies. Instead it has barely budged across the latest business cycle (see left-hand chart).
人們通常認為像最近全球經(jīng)濟收縮此類的嚴重衰退會壓低通貨膨脹率。失業(yè)的勞動者為了尋求就業(yè)機會理應(yīng)會降低薪資要求；有滯銷產(chǎn)品的企業(yè)應(yīng)該降低商品價格清理庫存。近些年來，人們有充分的理由來預(yù)計通貨膨脹率會降至零或者負值以下。2009年4月，國際貨幣基金組織預(yù)先通報了發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體當(dāng)年通貨膨脹率將會是-0.2%。相反，當(dāng)年的通貨膨脹率幾乎毫不為最近的商業(yè)周期所動(見右表)。
Deflation has been the “dog that didn’t bark”, notes the IMF in its new “World Economic Outlook”. When America’s unemployment rate jumped between 1980 and 1982, by 4.5 percentage points to 10.8%, core inflation plummeted from 12.0% to 4.5%. The jobless rate in America rose even more steeply between 2007 and 2009 but inflation dropped by less than one percentage point, from about 2.4% to 1.7%. Where inflation rates rose above central bankers’ targets, as in Britain, or below them, as in Japan, expectations of future rates still stayed close to the targets.
國際貨幣基金組織在其最新發(fā)布的《世界經(jīng)濟展望》中強調(diào)，通貨緊縮一直以來都是“一只不叫的狗”。1980年至1982年間，美國失業(yè)率躍升了4.5的百分點高達10.8%，而核心通貨膨脹率從12.0%降至4.5%。2007至2009年間，美國失業(yè)率升幅更加劇烈，可是通貨膨脹率卻下降了不到1個百分點，從2.4%降至1.7%。有些國家通貨膨脹率高于（以英國為例）或低于（以日本為例）央行目標通脹值，可通貨膨脹率預(yù)期卻始終接近于央行的目標值。
Some economists argue that stable inflation is a result of some big changes in the labour market. Wages and prices did not fall by much in recent years because jobless workers exited the labour force for good—a result of over-generous welfare benefits and obsolete skills. Such people do not compete with others for jobs and therefore cannot drag down inflation.
一些經(jīng)濟學(xué)家認為穩(wěn)定的通貨膨脹率是勞動力市場發(fā)生的巨變所致。近些年來，在過度慷慨的社會福利和勞動技能過時的情況下，失業(yè)勞動力永久退出勞動力市場，因此薪資水平和商品價格下降幅度不大。退出勞動力市場的工人不再與其他人競爭工作機會，因此他們不可能對降低通貨膨脹率產(chǎn)生任何影響。
Another view is that stability reflects central banks’ credibility. When central banks whipped inflation in the early 1980s and adopted low targets for it, they firmly anchored beliefs about future growth in prices and wages. This credibility is self-reinforcing. Workers who expect prices to rise only slowly tend not to push as hard for higher wages. That helps firms to keep costs and prices down. When the crisis struck, this process also helped avert deflation. If prices are not expected to drop, workers are less likely to accept wage cuts. Anticipating stable wage demands, employers are more reluctant to cut prices.
另一個觀點是通貨膨脹率所展現(xiàn)出的穩(wěn)定性反映了各國央行的可信度。上世紀80年代后期，各國央行大力遏制通貨膨脹并為其設(shè)定了較低的目標值，他們對未來商品價格和薪資水平可能會出現(xiàn)的增幅深信不疑。而這種可信度不斷在自我強化。期望商品價格緩慢上升的勞動者往往不會強烈要求提高薪資。這有助于企業(yè)保持低水平的成本和價格。當(dāng)經(jīng)濟危機來襲時，這一機制同樣也有助于抑制通貨緊縮。如果商品的價格預(yù)期不會降低，那么勞動者就不太可能會接受薪資的削減。穩(wěn)定的薪資要求在雇主的預(yù)期之內(nèi)，那么他們就更不會愿意降低商品的價格。
This second story seems a better fit for the data, argues the IMF. Since 1990 expected rates of inflation have inched ever closer to central-bank targets. And over the same period short-term gaps between actual inflation and the official target had ever weaker effects on people’s expectations. Markets seem to trust central banks to return inflation to target, and that trust itself helps keep it in line (though the dispersion in expected inflation rates seems to have widened lately).
國際貨幣基金組織認為，第二個理由似乎更能與數(shù)據(jù)相契合。自1990年以來,通貨膨脹率預(yù)期一直逐步向央行所設(shè)定的目標值靠攏。而同期實際通貨膨脹率和官方目標之間的短期差距對人們預(yù)期的影響越來越微弱。市場似乎相信央行能夠?qū)⑼ㄘ浥蛎浡士刂圃谀繕酥祪?nèi)，而且信任本身有助于通貨膨率不越雷池一步（雖然預(yù)期通貨膨脹率離散值似乎近來在擴大。）
As inflation has become more anchored, its links with other economic indicators have weakened. In a study of 21 rich countries since the 1960s, the IMF shows that changes in unemployment now influence inflation much less than in the past (see right-hand chart). Without the breakdown in this relationship, America’s economy would have faced deflation rates approaching 3% in the wake of the recent recession, the IMF notes.
隨著通貨膨脹率變得愈來愈穩(wěn)固，這一指標與其它經(jīng)濟指標之間的聯(lián)系也愈來愈弱。國際貨幣基金組織研究了自上世紀60年代以來21個發(fā)達國家的經(jīng)濟狀況，該研究表明：就目前而言，失業(yè)率的變動對通貨膨脹率的影響遠不如從前（見右表）。國際貨幣基金組織強調(diào)若是其間的關(guān)聯(lián)性保持不變，那么美國經(jīng)濟在最近一次經(jīng)濟衰退之初的通貨緊縮率將會接近3%的水平。
That is small comfort to inflation hawks, who fear that expectations may well prove less anchored during the next boom. After all, firms could easily be more enthusiastic about raising prices than cutting them. Yet experience before the financial crisis suggests that boom times may not be so different. In the decade before the crisis unemployment in Britain, Ireland and Spain dipped below its estimated “natural rate” (the lowest sustainable rate) for years at a time. Actual inflation and expectations of it hardly budged.
對于擔(dān)憂通貨膨脹率預(yù)期值在下次經(jīng)濟繁榮時期無法表現(xiàn)出強勁穩(wěn)定性的通脹鷹派來說，這足以讓他們稍感寬慰。畢竟，企業(yè)更熱衷于提高而不是降低商品價格。但是金融危機前的經(jīng)驗表明經(jīng)濟繁榮時期的情況或許沒有太大的差別。金融危機前的10年里，英國、愛爾蘭和西班牙曾出現(xiàn)過失業(yè)率連續(xù)幾年跌破其估計的“自然率”（最低可持續(xù)發(fā)展率）的情況。而實際通貨膨脹率和預(yù)期值幾乎毫不受此影響。
What could cause inflation expectations to break free again, as in the 1970s? Contrasting the experience of the American and German economies, the IMF reckons that central-bank independence makes all the difference. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank mistakenly saw 1970s-era unemployment as mostly temporary. But the Bundesbank managed to resist its government’s calls for looser monetary policy. The Fed, under its then chairman, Arthur Burns, was more responsive to Richard Nixon’s demands. Only in the late 1970s, when public opinion no longer saw unemployment but inflation as the chief economic evil, was it politically possible to give the Fed licence to stamp out inflation.
是什么因素導(dǎo)致了上世紀70年代通貨膨脹率預(yù)期值免受其他經(jīng)濟指標的影響呢？國際貨幣基金組織對比了美國和德國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的經(jīng)驗，據(jù)此得出結(jié)論認為央行的獨立性決定了一切。美聯(lián)儲和德國聯(lián)邦銀行均錯誤的認為70年代出現(xiàn)的失業(yè)不過是曇花一現(xiàn)。但是德國聯(lián)邦銀行成功地頂住了政府要求他們進一步放松貨幣政策的壓力。在當(dāng)時的美聯(lián)儲主席阿瑟•伯恩斯（Arthur Burns）的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，美聯(lián)儲積極地響應(yīng)了時任美國總統(tǒng)理查德•尼克松（Richard Nixon）的要求。僅僅在70年代后期，當(dāng)輿論認為經(jīng)濟的罪魁禍首主要是通貨膨脹而不是失業(yè)之后，美聯(lián)儲才能政治層面獲得抑制通貨膨脹率的許可。
Missing the target
漸漸迷失目標
Low inflation may be central bankers’ proudest achievement but it comes with its own set of economic risks, argues the IMF. The economic stability of the pre-crisis era may have fuelled the excess borrowing that led to the financial crisis. And a 2012 IMF working paper suggests that reining in inflation can increase income inequality by compressing wages while allowing asset prices to soar.
國際貨幣基金組織認為低通貨膨脹率或許是央行高管最引以為傲的成就，但低通脹率本身卻存在諸多經(jīng)濟風(fēng)險。前金融危機時代經(jīng)濟情況所表現(xiàn)出來的穩(wěn)定性或許給信貸泛濫起到了火上澆油的效果，而過渡舉債正是金融危機的導(dǎo)火索。國際貨幣基金組織在2012年發(fā)布的一份工作報告中指出，壓低薪資水平的同時卻允許資產(chǎn)價格飆升，通過這種手段來抑制通貨膨脹會擴大收入不公的差距。
More worryingly, the weakening link between inflation and unemployment could breed complacency about rising joblessness. Central bankers weaned on tales from the 1930s and 1980s, when soaring unemployment produced tumbling inflation, may have underestimated recent economic troubles because of stable inflation. An outbreak of deflation might have prompted them to act sooner and even more resolutely to battle the recession. Central banks are victims of their own success. With inflation no longer a reliable indicator of demand, they must look elsewhere to keep economies from running hot or cold.
更令人擔(dān)憂的是，通貨膨脹率和失業(yè)率之間日益脆弱的關(guān)聯(lián)性可能會令人對不斷上升的失業(yè)率毫無警覺，進而無動于衷。當(dāng)不斷上升的失業(yè)率導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹率不斷波動的時候，對上世紀30年和80年發(fā)生的一切熟稔于胸各國央行高管們或許因為穩(wěn)定的通貨膨脹率而低估了近來出現(xiàn)的經(jīng)濟問題。突然爆發(fā)的通貨緊縮或許會促使他們迅速行動，甚至?xí)仁顾麄兡贸鲎罹叱尚У慕鉀Q之法來應(yīng)對經(jīng)濟衰退。央行為其成功所累。由于通貨膨漲率不再是一個可靠的需求反映指標，各國央行必須另尋它途來防止經(jīng)濟運行過熱或是過冷。
Sources
資料來源
“The dog that didn’t bark: Has inflation been muzzled or was it just sleeping?”, IMF World Economic Outlook
“Innocent Bystanders? Monetary Policy and Inequality in the U.S.”, Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Lorenz Kueng, and John Silvia, IMF Working Paper
Economist.com/blogs/freeexchange
From the print edition: Finance and economics
